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THE ACA, PROVIDER MERGERS AND 
HOSPITAL PRICING: EXPERIMENTING 
WITH SMART, LOWER-COST HEALTH 
INSURANCE OPTIONS 
 
Susan Adler Channick1 
 
This paper addresses the issue of whether the recent significant uptick in provider 
mergers and the implementation of the Affordable Care Act have a particularly adverse effect on 
provider pricing in the commercial insurance market. Uncompetitive provider markets 
exacerbate already existing high cost issues such as lack of transparency in provider pricing, 
patient behavior that conflates reputation and quality, and payers’ inability, or at least 
reluctance, to exclude high-price providers from their networks. The ACA’s incentives for 
providers to coordinate patient care and hospitals’ revenue losses from reductions in Medicare 
reimbursement create further rationales for consolidation. The burden of finding solutions to 
high non-transparent provider pricing is on all stakeholders who should be experimenting in 
earnest with remedies for the harms that high health care costs create for patients. But no 
stakeholders have more incentive to find solutions than those who ultimately pay for health care: 
the insurers, the employers, governments and individuals. The recent literature is replete with 
payer experiments in insurance design that are intended to provide smart, lower-cost options for 
consumers and may influence provider behavior as well. More experimentation with remedial 
measures is warranted and appears to be ongoing even among providers who also see the 
proverbial handwriting on the wall. The ACA promises health care security by creating near-
universal, affordable, adequate health care. The work continues to achieve these goals. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past four years, hospital merger and acquisition activity has again been on the rise 
after a period of relative quiescence. The anticipated effects of the Affordable Care Act on 
hospital reimbursement and the impact of an already consolidated payer market are pushing both 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals toward consolidation in order to survive.2 While the hospital 
market had already experienced a wave of consolidation in the early 1990s in response to the 
power of private payers to negotiate high-risk, low reimbursement managed care contracts,3 the 
current provider reimbursement environment is creating additional downward pressures that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Professor, California Western School of Law; B.A., Cornell University; J.D., California Western School of Law; 
M.P.H., Harvard University 
2 Chris Myers and Jason Lineen, “Hospital Consolidation Outlook: Surviving in a Tough Economy,” Hospital 
Financial Management Association, November 2009, 
http://www.navigant.com/~/media/WWW/Site/Insights/Healthcare/Hospital%20Consolidation%20Outlook_Healthc
are.ashx.  
3 Gerald Adolph et al., “The Coming Surge in Health Provider M&A: How Historical Forces and Healthcare Reform 
Will Combine to Drive Activity,” Strategy& (formerly Booz & Company), 2012. 
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affected hospitals’ bottom lines.4 The ACA’s new reimbursement models reward providers for 
developing coordinated patient care models to replace the fragmented, fee-for-service 
reimbursement model that has been the hallmark of Medicare since its inception. Both Medicare 
and commercial payers are reimbursing providers for integrated care providing an impetus for 
both horizontal and vertical provider integration in order to achieve economies of scope as well 
as scale.5 
While mergers could be a boon for hospitals by creating efficiencies of scale and scope, 
mergers have been shown to lead to higher prices for consumers. Studies on hospital pricing 
suggest that expensive hospitals are often the result of patient demand for the “must-have” 
hospitals that are usually either part of a large consolidated health system or have a university 
affiliation, or offer unique Level I services.6 A number of studies have demonstrated that the 
imbalance in power between consolidated providers and payers leads to higher health care costs 
for consumers.7 Martin Gaynor, professor of economics and health policy at Carnegie Mellon 
University, has testified before the House Committee on Ways and Means Health Subcommittee 
that, “The research evidence shows that providers in more concentrated markets charge higher 
prices to private payers, without accompanying gains in efficiency or quality.”8 Higher-priced 
concentrated provider markets appear to be a result of hospitals consolidating in order to provide 
coordinated, integrated care at greater efficiencies.9 For legislation that seeks to bend the health 
care cost curve, the incentives of the ACA may actually be driving the costs of health care higher. 
And, if Professor Gaynor’s data are accurate, higher prices do not result in any value added for 
the patient or for the system.  
Recent studies have also shown an increase in hospital acquisitions of physician practices 
in order to be prepared for the coming integration of the health care delivery system.10 A 2011 
report found that “[m]ore than half of practicing physicians are now employed by hospitals or 
integrated delivery systems, a trend fueled by the intended creation of accountable care 
organizations (ACOs) and the prospect of more risk-based payment approaches.”11 From a health 
care delivery perspective, this trend toward vertical integration supports the goal of coordinated 
care; from a market perspective it is troubling because it further consolidates the provider market, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Jeff Goldsmith suggests that forces other than the ACA are at work. Cuts in Medicare reimbursement as well as a 
concerted push by Medicare to reclassify sub-acute admissions as observation stays increasing observation stays by 
34% and decreasing acute admissions have by almost 8%. Jeff C. Goldsmith, “Can Hospitals Survive? Part II,” The 
Health Care Blog, March 13, 2014. 
5 Laura Summer, “Integration, Concentration, and Competition in the Provider Marketplace,” 2010, 
https://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/AH_R_Integration%20FINAL2.pdf.  
6 Robert A. Berenson et al., “The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases From Insurers 
Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed,” 31 Health Affairs 973 (2012).  
7 Martin Gaynor and Robert Town, “The Impact Of Hospital Consolidation – Updates,” Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, June 2012, summarizing hospital concentration studies since 2006 for an association between hospital 
concentration and prices. 
8 Health Care Industry Consolidation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, September 9 2011, (statement of Martin Gaynor) 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/gaynor_testimony_9-9-11_final.pdf.  
9 Martin Gaynor, “Competition Policy In Health Care Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and Policy Maze,” 33 
Health Affairs 1088 (2014). 
10 Scott Baltic, “Monopolizing Medicine: Why hospital consolidation may increase healthcare costs,” Medical 
Economics (2014). 
11 Robert Kocher, M.D. and Nikhil Sahni, “Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians – The Logic behind a Money-
Losing Proposition,” The New England Journal of Medicine 364, 19 (2011): 1790. 
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creating market power that converts into less competition and higher prices for payers who are 
ultimately individual purchasers and employees.12 While there is little argument in the health 
care community that integrated care can be value-added, the fear that provider integration will 
become market concentration seems well-founded.13  
The question that this paper addresses is what can be done to remediate the effects of 
both existing and future market concentration on the price of health care. Antitrust legislation 
can often prevent illegal market dominance, but it cannot prevent integration that is lawful, nor 
can it prohibit the legal monopolist from charging whatever prices it can obtain from its market 
dominance. 14  In addition, antitrust law generally is ineffective in undoing monopolistic 
transactions that have already created high-priced health care markets.15 Ensuring affordable 
health care is essential not only to the success of the ACA but also to the success of the United 
States in constraining the growth of health care spending. Although there are many variables to 
health care spending, there is little doubt that provider pricing is key.16  
 
II. HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND THE ECONOMY 
Health care spending is a key component of any industrialized country’s economy. The 
benefits of a robust health care system are many, most importantly ensuring healthy and 
productive lives for its population.17 Mature health care systems are costly but none as costly as 
the U.S. health care system.18 The 2013 spending for the United States both in the public and 
private sectors was $2.9 trillion, accounting for 17.4% of gross domestic product, as reported by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.19 Unlike other sectors of the U.S. economy, a 
large portion of this spending is publicly funded, i.e., the federal government and the states bear 
at least some portion of the costs of health care. The burden of high health care costs has already 
had a powerful impact on state and federal budgets in the public sector20 and on employers, 
employees, and individuals in the private sector.21 Health economists have long recognized the 
need to “bend the cost curve” by controlling the rate of health care cost growth.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Diane Kiehl, Driving Meaningful Changes, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, September 2011 (statement of Diane Kiehl) 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/kiehl_testimony_9-9-11_final.pdf.  
13 David Balto, Health Industry Consolidation, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, September 2011, (statement of David Balto) 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/balto_testimony_9-9-11_final.pdf.  
14 Martin Gaynor, “Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and Policy Maze,” 33 
Health Affairs 1088 (June 13, 2014). 
15 Id. 
16 Gerard F. Anderson et al., “It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is So Different From Other Countries,” 
22 Health Affairs 3 (2003): 89. 
17 David A. Squires, “Explaining High Health Care Spending In The United States: An International Comparison Of 
Supply, Utilization, Prices, And Quality,” 2012, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-
briefs/2012/may/high-health-care-spending. 
18  OECD Health Data 2012, “U.S. Health Care System From An International Perspective,” 2012, 
http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/HealthSpendingInUSA_HealthData2012.pdf.  
19  Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “National Health Expenditures 2013 Highlights,” 2014 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html. 
20 Susan A. Channick, “Taming the Beast of Health Care Costs: Why Medicare Reform Alone is Not Enough,” 21 
Annals of Health Law 89 (2012). 
21  Karen Pollitz et al., “Medical Debt Among People With Health Insurance,” 2014, http://kff.org/private-
insurance/report/medical-debt-among-people-with-health-insurance/.  
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The Affordable Care Act, enacted primarily to expand access to affordable, adequate 
health care to almost all Americans, also includes a number of initiatives intended to slow down 
the rise in health care costs. Many of these measures either directly or indirectly target 
reimbursement to providers, particularly hospitals.22 In addition, the recent federal budget 
compromise continues the two percent cut to Medicare reimbursement rates as a result of the 
2012 sequester.23 Whether or not measures in the ACA that were included to affect the future 
cost of health care will provide a permanent solution to rising health care growth rates is, as yet, 
an unanswered question. To a large extent, the answer to this question requires more complete 
implementation of these measures and an examination of the cost outcomes data. However, 
hospitals, feeling the immediate or anticipated reduction in revenue, are making structural 
changes to their budgets to ameliorate the effects of reduced revenue.24 They are also taking 
steps to aggregate market power in order to prevail in reimbursement negotiations with 
commercial payers by engaging in both horizontal and vertical integration measures.25  
Structural changes to budget may be required in difficult economic times, but market 
consolidation is not a strategy that is efficient in many markets.26 The question is whether health 
care provider consolidation should be encouraged for its coordination efficiencies or constrained 
because of the likelihood of market consolidation inefficiencies. While the goal of integration, 
particularly horizontal integration, is to increase efficiencies by economies of scale and scope, a 
not-so-unintended consequence may be a concomitant rise in health care costs as a result of 
market concentration. The policy of the ACA in favor of delivering coordinated care invites 
different levels of providers like hospitals, physician groups, and clinics to integrate in order to 
create health care delivery efficiencies. These vertical integrations are thought by some to add to 
the provider market concentration problem. As has been previously noted by some health policy 
experts, “It appears that the main purpose of health care entities in forming ACOs may not be to 
achieve cost savings to be shared with Medicare but to strengthen negotiating power over 
purchasers in the private sector.”27  
The findings of the IOM that post-hospitalization costs drive Medicare cost variations 
strengthens the arguments in favor of more coordinated care for Medicare and perhaps Medicaid 
where the payers set the price.28 Indeed, the IOM report advocates in favor of the adoption and 
more wide-spread use of various payment reforms such as value-based payments that should 
incentivize coordinated care with improved outcomes rather than fragmented care and overuse, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Donald Sjoerdsma, “The Affordable Care Act Ushered in Billions in Provider Payment Cuts,” The Medicare 
Newsgroup, March 22, 2013, http://www.medicarenewsgroup.com/context/understanding-medicare-
blog/understanding-medicare-blog/2013/03/22/the-affordable-care-act-ushered-in-billions-in-provider-payment-cuts. 
23 Paul Sisson, “Hospitals Fight Budget Deal’s Medicare Cuts,” San Diego Union Tribune, December 15 2013. 
24 Toby Cosgrove, “The Great Consolidation Begins,”  
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130311203646-205372152-the-great-consolidation-begins, March 11, 2013. 	  
25 Julie Creswell and Reed Abelson, “New Laws and Rising Costs Create a Surge of Supersizing Hospitals,” New 
York Times, August 12, 2013.  
26 Because the health care market is so different from other markets, the policies of consolidation are not so easily 
dealt with. In other markets such as retail and Internet, anti-competition policy sets the boundaries for monopolistic 
behavior. In the health care market, where provider consolidation has been determined to have real value, should the 
growth of hospital systems continue to be encouraged? David M. Cutler and Fiona S. Morton, “Hospitals, Market 
Share, and Consolidation,” 310 JAMA 1964 (2013).  
27 Barak D. Richman and Kevin A. Schulman, “A Cautious Path Forward on Accountable Care Organizations,” 305 
JAMA 602 (2011).  
28 Joseph P. Newhouse et al., “Variation in Health Care Spending: Target Decision Making, Not Geography,” The 
National Academies Press (2013).  
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underuse and misuse of health care resources.29 Surely a more clinically integrated health 
delivery system should be the goal in the private payer sector as well. But, as the IOM report on 
variation in health care spending demonstrates, cost of care variation in the private sector is 
driven more by financial integration and market power than by lack of clinical integration. 
Indeed, financial integration and market power is a common response of many private providers, 
particularly hospitals, to the current assault on their bottom lines by provisions in the Affordable 
Care Act that were enacted for the purpose of reducing unnecessary health care costs.30 The 
particular conundrum posed by the ACA’s incentives toward delivery and reimbursement 
systems reform is that Accountable Care Organizations, particularly those that are hospital-based, 
will serve both Medicare and commercially-insured populations. Health policy makers will need 
to consider both the value of coordinated delivery modalities to provide better outcomes at lower 
costs and the potential for mischief by concentrated provider markets to increase prices and raise 
costs.  
The question of whether reduced competition really drives up costs is difficult to assess 
in a complex market like health care where the consumer is generally indifferent to the price of 
services because of the effect of a third-party payer, the insurer, and the real cost of the service is 
unavailable to the consumer because of the lack of transparency of health care pricing, 
particularly hospital pricing.31 However, recent studies indicate that hospital prices are higher in 
concentrated health provider markets.32 Payers in such markets lack sufficient bargaining power 
to say no to “must-have” hospitals whose size and reputation create demand for their inclusion in 
provider networks. One of the fears about consolidated markets is how continued provider 
leverage with payers will affect the ACA’s mandate to provide less expensive, higher quality 
care through coordinated delivery methods. If hospital pricing continues to rise, higher prices for 
health care services may simply offset any savings that can be achieved by coordinated provider 
care models.33 
While promising cost control measures have been attempted in the past, none has had a 
permanent effect on the rate of rise in health care costs. In the wake of the late 1990s Managed 
Care backlash, which had successfully controlled costs for a limited time, the average yearly 
growth rate of real health spending again began to rise. 34 In the decade from 1998 and 2008, the 
average annual rate of growth of total health care expenditures (NHE) was seven percent. In 
2007, coincident with the Great Recession, the rate of growth dropped to six percent, and in 2008, 
to 4.4 percent.35 The CMS Office of the Actuary reported recently that from 2009 – 13, the rate 
of growth of NHE remained stable at somewhere between 3.6 – 3.8 percent annually, making the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Recently, HHS has disclosed both hospital pricing and physician reimbursement based on Medicare billing data. 
Margaret D. Tocknell, “CMS Releases Hospital Pricing Data,” Healthleaders Media, May 9, 2013; Christopher 
Weaver, “Small Slice of Doctors Account for Big Chunk of Medical Costs,” Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2014.  
32 Gaynor and Town, supra note 7.  
33 David Dranove, “Viewing Health Care Consolidation through the Lens of the Economics of Strategy,” March 
2010, http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/HCFOReportMarch2010.pdf.  
34 The average growth rate is stated in terms of real health spending deflated by the GDP deflator published by the 
National Bureau of Economic Analysis. Amitabh Chandra et al., “Is This Time Different? The Slowdown in 
Healthcare Spending,” 2013 http://www.nber.org/papers/w19700.  
35 Robert Pear, “Health Spending Rises in 2008, but at Slower Rate,” New York Times, January 5, 2010. 
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growth in the past four years the slowest ever recorded in the fifty-three-year history of the 
National Health Expenditure Accounts.36  
Therefore, it is somewhat ironic that as the ACA is being fully implemented, both the 
growth rate of health care costs and the rate of health care price inflation are the lowest in 
decades with predictions of continued moderation for the next decade.37 Some economists like 
Peter Orszag, the former director of both the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of 
Management and Budget during President Obama's first term, attribute at least some of the 
decline in the health cost curve to the ACA.38 There is not, however, unilateral agreement on this 
interpretation of these data and the reason for the declines remains an open question. Other 
health care economists attribute the drop in growth to the recent slowdown in the economy, an 
interpretation that means that the growth rate may start rising again as the economy recovers.39 
And in a recent article in the journal Health Affairs, the authors conclude that “most of the recent 
slowdown in health care spending, at least among the working population, can be attributed to 
the economic slowdown and not to other factors such as early responses to the ACA.”40 
 Still others argue that the rise in health care spending has really not changed at all, 
arguing that health care expenditure growth has always represented a remarkably stable 30 
percent of GDP growth.41 While it seems unlikely that the ACA has had sufficient time to 
significantly impact health care costs, proponents of the ACA-connection theory like Orszag 
argue that proposed changes to reimbursement may be sufficient in themselves to drive down the 
rate of growth of health care costs.42 In other words, providers are becoming fiscally leaner and 
meaner in response to the fear and reality of diminishing reimbursement from payers in both the 
public and private sectors.  
The decrease in NHE growth rates is, of course, good news to a country that spends a 
significant portion of GDP on health care. They are particularly good news in the public sector 
where the money to finance health care costs is finite. As has been explained in past literature, 
Congress allocates a relatively set share of GDP for federal spending, usually no more than 18 
percent, of which Medicare’s share for 2014 is calculated to be 16 percent.43 With an assumed 
2014 federal budget allocation of $3.8 trillion, the CBO’s 2013 budget projection of Medicare’s 
share is somewhere in the range of $600 billion, surely not an insignificant expenditure. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Gary Claxton et al., “Health Benefits in 2014: Stability in Premiums and Coverage for Employer-Sponsored 
Plans,” Health Affairs Online (2014), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2014/09/05/hlthaff.2014.0792; 
Anne B. Martin et al., “National Health Spending in 2012: Rate of Health Spending Growth Remained Low for the 
Fourth Consecutive Year,” 33 Health Affairs 67 (2014). 
37 David M. Cutler and Nikhil R. Sahni, “If Slow Rate of Health Care Spending Persists, Projections May Be Off By 
$770 Billion,” 32 Health Affairs. 841 (2013).  
38 Aaron Task, “Obamacare Working Even Better Than Peter Orszag Expected,” The Daily Ticker, September 9, 
2013. 
39 Containing Health Care Costs: Recent Progress and Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the 
Budget, July 30, 2013, (statement of Joseph Antos), 
http://www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/public/_cache/files/46057500-e051-4074-80ab-afc01b9d230f/07-30-13-
antos-sbc-containing-health-costs.pdf.  
40 David Dranove et al., “Health Spending Slowdown is Mostly Due to Economic Factors, Not Structural Change in 
the Health Care Sector,” 33 Health Affairs 1399 (2014).  
41 Charles Roehrig, “Further Thoughts on the Recession and Health Spending,” Health Affairs Blog, May 7, 2013, 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/05/07further-thoughts-on-the-recessions-and-health-spending/.  
42 Louise Radnofsky, “How the ACA May Affect Health Costs,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2014. 
43 Joseph P. Newhouse, “Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key Groups of Americans,” 29 Health Affairs 
1719, 2010.  
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However, compared to the $700 billion CBO 2010 projection for 2014 Medicare spending, a 
$100 billion reduction in spending is a remarkable savings.44 While Medicare spending over time 
is certain to rise because of the baby-boomer increased utilization effect, the CBO 2013 
projection predicts a rise in Medicare cost growth rate of only .04% holding 2020 Medicare 
spending to approximately $850 billion compared to the 2010 projection for Medicare spending 
of $1 trillion.45 As health care journalist Sarah Kliff says, “If that cost growth persists, it could 
make all the difference for Medicare: The entitlement program would, by 2085, make up 4 
percent of the economy instead of the previously projected 7 percent.”46 Lower Medicare 
spending means more available revenue for discretionary spending and a decreased possibility of 
large deficits, scenarios that positively affect federal debt. It is also good news to seniors whose 
out-of-pocket health care spending could be lowered. 
Private sector spending has also decreased since the recession to a rate of 3.6 percent.47 
The real question is why. Has the cost curve really flattened or is reduced spending in the private 
sector an artifact of lower demand attributable both to a slow-growth economy and structural 
changes in the health care system including the design of insurance products?48 The shifting of 
costs from employers to employees and the burden of high deductible insurance on individuals is 
blamed for a reduction in health care utilization, particularly in lean economic times, and 
concomitantly lower rates of health care spending growth.49 As the economy improves, the 
question remains whether a more robust economy will also raise health care utilization. A 
number of economists have demonstrated that, while Medicare spending growth appears 
untethered to GDP growth, private health insurance is very strongly associated with GDP 
growth. 50  As the economy continues to improve, employers and employees with more 
discretionary dollars may again be willing to absorb the burden of higher commercial health 
insurance costs resulting in increased utilization, perhaps higher health care price inflation, and 
an upward tick in NHE.51  
The $2.8 trillion question is whether this exceptionally low growth rate is sustainable. 
While, as previously noted, it is yet unclear what effect the ACA has had on health care costs, 
Medicare reimbursement is more likely to have already been impacted by changes made by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Congressional Budget Office, “Updated Budget Projection: Fiscal Years 2013 To 2023,” May 2013; 
Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2010,” January 2010. 
45 Id. 
46 Sarah Kliff, “Want to Debate Medicare Costs? You Need to See This Chart First,” Washington Post Wonkblog, 
March 15, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/15/want-to-debate-medicare-costs-you-
need-to-see-this-chart-first/.  
47 The most recent findings by the Kaiser Family Foundation survey of employers’ health benefits just reported that 
employer-sponsored health insurance premiums rose only three percent from last year but employee deductibles rose. 
How much of the decrease in premiums is due to containing health care costs versus higher deductibles is the real 
story here. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Employer Health Benefits 2014 Annual Survey,” 2014. 
48 There is substantial controversy over identifying causes of the recent slowdown in health care spending as 
between the recession and structural changes to the health care system. Jordan Rau, “2 Studies Assert Lower 
Spending Growth is Due to Structural Health Changes,” Kaiser Family Foundation, May 6, 2013.  
49 Id. 
50 Andrea M. Sisko et al., “National Health Expenditure Projections, 2013–2023: Faster Growth Expected With 
Expanded Coverage and Improving Economy,” Health Affairs Online (September 2014), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2014/08/27/hlthaff.2014.0560.full.pdf+html.  
51 Even with an improvement in the economy, employers may not be willing to finance rich health plan costs as they 
have done in the past, particularly if plans back up against the so-called Cadillac plan excise tax. Julie Piotrowski, 
“Excise Tax on ‘Cadillac’ Plans,” Health Affairs Health Policy Briefs (January 7, 2013). 
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ACA than any other sector. As reported by Kronick and Po, the Affordable Care Act contributes 
significantly to the reduction in Medicare cost inflation “and is the primary cause of the 
projections of continued slow growth of Medicare spending over the next decade.” 52 If the 
Medicare cost projection assumption is true,53 and if price inflation in the healthcare private 
sector can be correlated with the Medicare sector, there is some reason to believe that this time 
really is different. However, economists generally agree that Medicare spending and private 
commercial health care spending are not correlated; spending in the commercial sector is 
affected by other factors such as economic growth and the change in health insurance design, 
neither of which affect Medicare spending.54  
 In fact, there is substantial confusion about whether health care spending is continuing to 
trend downward or is starting to drift upward again after 14 years of relatively low growth. A 
recent article in the journal Health Affairs, reporting on low growth in the rate of health spending, 
argues that the relative stability of growth since 2009 primarily reflects the lagged impacts of the 
recent severe economic recession with the Affordable Care Act having minimal impact.55 The 
article reports an uptick in personal health spending based on data from the CMS Office of the 
Actuary of .04% from 2011 to 2012 influenced primarily by hospital services for which spending 
increased 4.9 percent in 2012 compared to 3.5 percent in 2011.56 Since the publication in Health 
Affairs, others have reported similar upticks in health care spending driven primarily by an 
increase of $8 billion in hospital revenue in the fourth quarter 2013, more than in the past four 
quarters combined.57  
The Altarum Institute Center for Sustainable Health Spending reports data that support 
the conclusion that health care costs are again rising. Its report demonstrates that NHE in January 
2014 grew 6.2% year-over-year, and February 2014 growth was 6.7% year-over-year, the highest 
growth rate observed since March 2007.58 Altarum believes that this uptick in spending is not the 
result of the newly insured under the ACA; its data has spending growth rising well before 
January 2014 when the applicable provisions of the ACA went into effect.59 Hospitals and 
prescription drugs experienced the highest growth rates year-over-year from 2013 – 2014; 
hospital spending grew by more than eight percent and prescription drug spending by 9.3 
percent.60 What effect the ACA will have on health care spending requires more data that 
specifically reflects ACA initiatives, and is yet unknown, but the uptick in prices prior to 
implementation of the ACA suggests that other forces may be exerting upward pressure on 
spending.61 Altarum has since moderated its predictions for rising national health spending from 
6.2% year-over-year to 4.8% based on revised spending data from the Bureau of Economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Richard Kronick and Rosa Po, “Growth In Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary Continues To Hit Historic Lows,” 
Department of Health & Human Services, 2013. 
53 Adrianna McIntyre, “Orszag: It’s time for some optimism about health care spending,” Vox, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/15/5807046/orszag-its-time-for-some-optimism-about-health-care-spending.  
54 Id. 
55 See generally Martin, supra note 36. 
56 Id. at 69. 
57 Paul Davidson, “Health care spending growth hits 10-year high,” USA Today, April 1, 2014. 
58 Altarum Institute Center For Sustainable Health Spending, “Spending Brief #14-04: February 2014 Data,” 2014. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 2. 
61 Id.  
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Analysis. Although spending is growing more moderately than earlier predicted, there are still 
indicators that the health care cost curve is likely to rise more steeply in the near future.62  
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) released a report that similarly predicts continued health 
care spending growth, predicting 6.5% in 2014 and 6.8% in 2015.63 PwC attributes a higher 
growth rate to a stronger economy, rising pharmaceutical pricing because of advances in very 
expensive specialty prescription drugs, physician employment by hospitals, and, of course, 
increased utilization of health care services as a result of increasingly larger pools of people who 
are insured as a result of the ACA. Higher utilization is then compounded by the effect of higher 
hospital pricing in markets that have become uncompetitive due to hospital market concentration. 
In such a situation, the only ways to lower health care spending is to disincentivize usage or find 
ways to reduce the price of health care.  
These predictions of an upswing in health care spending were predicated based on early 
estimates by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of 2014 first quarter health care spending. 
Initially, the BEA had estimated a 9.9 percent increase in health care spending in first quarter 
2014; in its final estimate, health care spending declined by 1.4 percent in the quarter.64 The 
BEA attributed this unusually large discrepancy to the fact that Commerce Department does not 
release its QSS for first quarter, the BEA’s main health care spending survey, until June, and 
noise created by the expansion of the insurance coverage under the ACA in first quarter 2014.65 
The unexpected drop in health care spending is primarily responsible for the 2.9 percent decline 
in GDP, three times steeper than the Department of Commerce’s first quarterly GDP estimate.66 
There are a number of different takes on the decline in health care spending. While the 
BEA’s Jason Furman attributes the slowdown in part to the ACA,67 the Wall Street Journal 
decries “ObamaCare’s role in nearly sending the economy back into recession.”68 Closer to the 
truth is that no-one yet has a real handle on how the introduction of the ACA has affected health 
care spending, a forecast that requires multiple data points to resolve. The BEA’s second quarter 
estimate of health care spending was flat at .07 percent increase with a 1.8 percent in health care 
prices.69 While these numbers seem promising, the CEA’s Furman warns that they could be 
subject to massive changes as more data is available. A recent study in the journal Health Affairs 
finds that approximately 70 percent of the slowdown in health spending is explained by the 
economic slowdown rather than by any structural changes to the health sector including 
components of the ACA.70 If indeed the state of the economy is primarily responsible for recent 
low health care spending, then a period of steady economic growth should correlate with higher 
health care spending in the private sector. The question, later addressed in this paper, is whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Altarum Institute Center for Sustainable Health Spending, “Anticipated acceleration in health spending seems to 
be delayed,” 2014. 
63 PricewaterhouseCoopers Health Research Institute, “Medical Cost Trend: Behind the Numbers,” June 2014. 
64 Jason Furman, “Third Estimate of GDP for the First Quarter of 2014,” Council of Economic Advisers, June 25, 
2014, www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/06/25/third-estimate-gdp-first-quarter-2014.  
65 Id. 
66 California Healthline, “Unexpected Drop in Health Care Spending Causes 2.9% Decline in GDP,” June 26, 2014, 
www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2014/6/26/unexpected-drop-in-health-care-spending-causes-29-decline-in-gdp.  
67 Furman, supra note 64. 
68 Opinion, “GDP’s ObamaCare DownGrade,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2014. 
69 Brett Logiurato, “This Chart Shows How Healthcare Spending Estimates in GDP Reports Are A Disaster,” 
Business Insider, July 30, 2014.  
70 David Dranove et al., “Health Spending Slowdown is Mostly Due to Economic Factors, Not Structural Change In 
the Health Care Sector,” 33 Health Affairs 1399 (2014).  
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payers, that is both insurers and employers, have the will to rein in costs caused by excess 
utilization and high provider pricing and to innovate in ways that do not unfairly shift the costs 
of health care to the consumer. 
 
  III.  HOSPITAL PRICING 
 Of late, the health care cost spotlight has been on hospital pricing. Examining health care 
pricing is not new but, since prices have recently been identified as the fundamental driver of 
health care costs, the scrutiny of hospital pricing has become more rigorous and high-profile.71 In 
May 2013, the CMS released for the first time hospital pricing data by making public 
chargemaster data for the 100 most common Medicare DRGs.72 The New York Times followed 
up with a series of articles by Elizabeth Rosenthal on hospital pricing.73 These efforts unveil 
information strongly associated with the extraordinary cost of health care in the United States. 
First is simply the exposure of price information; until recently, hospital chargemasters have 
been closely-guarded secrets not shared with consumers.74 In the commercial health insurance 
world, prices negotiated by providers and insurers are often not transparent because of hospitals’, 
particularly “must-have” hospitals, ability to insist on the inclusion of gag clauses that prevent 
disclosure of the negotiated prices.75 Device makers may also insist on gag clauses in their 
contracts with providers so that many physicians choosing the appropriate device for their 
patients have no knowledge of its price.76  
In addition to the lack of price transparency, the prices themselves are staggering and 
explain much about why the U.S. spends significantly more on health care than other first-world 
nations. Adding to high, non-transparent pricing is the triple threat of tremendous variability in 
pricing which is not just inter- or even intrastate but within the same geographic location. While 
such a pricing scheme seems inexplicable, there are a number of possible explanations. The 
“must-have” hospital or health system phenomenon which gives these hospitals extraordinary 
bargaining power as well as lack of competition because of hospital market concentration and 
lack of price transparency are some of likely explanations for pricing variability.  
Hospitals often argue that chargemaster prices are irrelevant because those prices are 
rarely assessed or collected.77 Medicare and Medicaid payments are set administratively and 
patients cannot be liable for any “unpaid” balance. Those with commercial insurance benefit 
from the negotiating power of the insurer and are subject only to negotiated fees.78 Only the 
uninsured or underinsured may be subject to chargemaster pricing. While the number of 
uninsured may be shrinking because of the insurance requirements of the ACA, the number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care has, for 20 years, examined the relationship between health care spending 
and outcomes using data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. These data have demonstrated wide 
variations in regional health care spending in relation to the quality of patient outcomes. But see Joseph J. Doyle, 
“Returns To Local Health Care Spending: Evidence From Health Shocks To Patients Far From Home,” 3 American 
Economic Journal 221 (2011). 
72 “Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data,” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2013).  
73 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill,” New York Times, June 1, 2013.  
74 Steven Brill, “Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us,” Time, February 2013. 
75  Maura Calsyn, “Shining Light on Health Care Prices,” Center for American Progress, April 3, 2014, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/report/2014/04/03/87059/shining-light-on-health-care-prices/. 
76 Id. 
77 Brill, supra note 74. 
78 Of course, provider concentration gives providers leverage over payers in negotiating prices resulting in both 
higher health insurance premium costs and higher out-of-pocket costs. See text accompanying notes 6-8. 
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underinsured is increasing due to changes in employer health plan designs that shift the burden 
of rising health care costs onto the employee.79 Enrollment in high-deductible plans has tripled 
since 2009, a trend that disincentivizes health care utilization by consumers who are the ultimate 
payers. 80  The shift in insurance design may tamp down health care costs because of 
underutilization by consumers who cannot afford it, but at what cost to health?81 Consumer 
directed health plans may bring down health care spending as described above, but they will do 
little to reduce prices or incentivize greater efficiencies unless payers, including consumers, 
become active purchasers of health care. Otherwise, such plans simply shift the cost burden to 
consumers who then may opt to forego valuable health care services. 
Few facts about hospital pricing seem unambiguous. One factor that seems consistent 
both to Medicare and commercial insurance is that hospital outpatient departments are the most 
expensive venues for the delivery of care. Medicare reimbursement for services performed in an 
outpatient department of a hospital is 80 percent higher than it would be if it had been performed 
in a physician’s office. In 2010, Medicare paid hospitals $1.3 billion more for just two services – 
evaluation and management visits, and echocardiograms – than it would have paid if these 
services had been performed in a physician’s office. And in 2011, that number rose to $1.5 
billion.82 Location is also a cost imperative for commercial insurance. As noted by a recent study, 
the result of a collaborative effort by the National Institute for Health Care Reform (NIHCR) and 
the former Center for Studying Health System Change, “average hospital outpatient department 
prices for common imaging, colonoscopy, and laboratory services can be double the price for 
identical services provided in a physician’s office or other community-based setting.” 83 
According to the research brief, hospitals justify the higher payments because of higher overhead 
costs related to stand-ready capacity for emergencies and additional regulatory requirements 
imposed by legislation such as EMTALA, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act.84 MedPAC estimates that a move toward establishing a single-payer rate for the service 
regardless of the location of its delivery could save Medicare an estimated $1 billion to $5 billion 
over five years.85 Hospitals, whose revenue would be threatened by a fee reduction for hospital 
out-patient care, are responding as they are to all reimbursement reductions: by acquiring 
physician practices so that the delivery of health care is done by employed physicians in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2014 Touchstone Survey, 85 percent of employers have already 
implemented or are considering an increase in employee cost sharing through plan design changes. Eighteen percent 
of employers now offer a high-deductible health plan as the only insurance option for their employees. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Medical Cost Trend: Behind the Numbers 2015,” (2014).  
80 Jay Hancock, “More High Deductible Plan Members Can’t Pay Hospital Bills,” Kaiser Health News, August 12, 
2013. 
81 Amelia Haviland, et al., “Growth of Consumer Directed Health Plans to One-Half of All Employer-Sponsored 
Insurance Could Save $57 Billion Annually,” 31 Health Affairs 1009 (2012). 
82 MEDPAC, “Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy,” Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (2014) 
at 3.  
83 James D. Reschovsky and Chapin White, “Location, Location, Location: Hospital Outpatient Prices Much Higher 
than Community Settings for Identical Services,” 16 National Institute for Health Care Reform 1 (2014). 
84 EMTALA, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, requires that all hospitals with emergency 
departments that are Medicare providers must screen and stabilize all patients with a medical emergency regardless 
of their ability to pay. Keeping the Promise: Site-of Service Medicare Payment Reforms: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Health of House Commission On Energy and Commerce, May 21, 2014, (statement of the 
American Hospital Association), available at www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/testimony/2014/140521-tes-
siteneutral.pdf. 
85 See MEDPAC (2014), supra note 82 at 54. 
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more expensive HOPDs. The NIHCR report states that such practices simply increase growing 
provider market concentration and exacerbate an already intractable health care pricing 
scheme.86 
 
IV.  FRAGMENTATION VERSUS CONSOLIDATION AND THE EFFECT ON HEALTH 
CARE COSTS  
One of goals of the ACA is to effect changes in the delivery and reimbursement of at 
least those insured by public programs, Medicare in particular, by changing the methods of 
health care delivery and reimbursement. While experimentation with value-based payment 
programs has been ongoing for at least a decade prior to the adoption of the ACA, the Act offers 
financial incentives to providers that adopt delivery system changes that strive for better patient 
outcomes at lower cost.87 Accountable care organizations and other similar delivery models are 
new delivery paradigms utilizing value-based payment (VBP) that are included in the ACA. 
These delivery paradigms are intended to incentivize provider coordination in the provision of 
health care to a defined population and reimbursement on a value-based payment system with 
shared savings between the providers and the payer.88  
Under the ACA model, providers receive a global fee for coordinating the patient’s care, 
hopefully resulting in a better outcome for the patient and better value for the payer.89 
Correlatively, providers may assume a collective risk for fragmented, uncoordinated care that 
result in higher costs to the payer; in such ACOs, providers have a downside risk but their 
upside reward is potentially higher than in the traditional ACO.90 Through the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program, providers can share savings that accrue to Medicare as a result of the 
coordination of the patient’s care by the ACO. The promise of increased revenue has 
incentivized the enrollment of 250 Medicare ACOs as of January 10, 2013 in the MSSP. 
Already as many as four million, or approximately 10 percent of Medicare beneficiaries, are 
now covered by an ACO.91  
Although prior experimentation with VBP models has yielded only very modest success 
in both outcome and cost savings, CMS elected to use the VBP paradigm to achieve the three-
pronged goal of the ACA: better health outcomes for patients, healthier populations, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Reschovsky and White, supra note 83.  
87 See e.g. “Better, Smarter, Healthier: Health Care Payment Learning and Action Network kick off to advance value 
and quality in health care,” March 25, 2015, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/03/20150325b.html. 
88 The term “Accountable Care Organization” is slippery; it can be broadly or narrowly interpreted. The Putnam 
Research Associates defines an Accountable Care Organization as a group of health care providers in a care delivery 
system who agree to accept joint responsibility for the medical care and management as well as the cost and quality 
outcomes of a designated population of patients to achieve shared goals of better care at a lower total cost. Kevin J. 
Gorman, “Cutting Through the ACO Confusion,” Putnam Associates, 2013. Oliver Wyman defines an ACO as a 
catch-all term for providers participating in population-oriented, value-based care delivery and reimbursement 
models. This definition includes only provider organizations that are working under value-based shared savings or 
risk arrangements on the total cost of care for one or more sets of attributed patients. Niym Ghandi and Richard Weil, 
“The ACO Surprise,” Oliver Wyman, 2012. 
89 Harold Miller, “The Building Blocks of Successful Payment Reform: Designing Payment Systems that Support 
Higher-Value Health Care,” Network for Regional Healthcare Improvement, April 2015. 
90 Charles Fiegl, “Medicare pioneer ACOs save money but lose physicians,” American Medical News, July 2013. 
91 David Muhlestein, “Continued Growth of Public and Private Accountable Care Organizations,” Health Affairs 
Blog, February 2013, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/19/continued-growth-of-public-and-private-accountable-
care-organizations/.  
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decreased health care costs.92 Starting in 2013, the ACA mandates enactment of the “Hospital 
Value-based Purchasing Program,” a program that directly ties hospital performance based on a 
number of key metrics, both clinical and patient satisfaction, to reimbursement rates for 
Medicare patients.93 Pursuant to the program, Medicare has reduced its payments to all hospitals 
by one percent but gives hospitals the opportunity to “earn back” the lost revenue if they meet 
certain metrics.94 According to Kaiser Health News, in California in 2012, 44 percent of 
hospitals received a bonus under the program while 56 percent were penalized.95 By 2017, VBP 
will increase its penalty or bonuses to two percent, and in 2015, the value-based purchasing 
program will apply to physician groups of 100 or more and to all physicians by 2017. 
Commercial health insurers have also jumped on the bandwagon of coordinated care and 
value-based payment methods.96 A recent Blue Cross Blue Shield Association survey of BDBS 
companies reveals a diverse portfolio of more than 350 locally-developed, value- based 
programs in 49 states, Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico making BCBS a market leader in 
developing and executing VBPs.97 So strongly does BCBS believe in the efficacy of payment 
reform from fee-for-service to value-based purchasing that its 37 independent companies have 
spent more than $65 billion – about one in five medical claim dollars – in programs that provide 
“incentives for better health outcomes for patients while reducing costly duplication and waste 
in care delivery.”98 The value-based purchasing measures “range from medical homes, where 
doctors may receive an additional fee to better coordinate patient care, to accountable care 
organizations, or ACOs, where a larger health system shares some of the savings if it can 
manage patients’ health for less money.”99 
The so-called accountable care organization model of delivery and reimbursement is 
designed to shift from a traditionally fragmented system to a more coordinated one that not only 
improves outcomes but also reduces waste and drives down costs.100  Commercial insurers 
recognize that the cost of health care has become intolerable to the ultimate payers - employers, 
employees and individuals. Employers have increasingly been shifting the cost of health care to 
their employees, both directly in the form of increased premium and out-of-pocket costs for the 
employee, and indirectly by paying the increased cost of health insurance in lieu of raising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Cheryl Damburg et al., “Measuring Success in Healthcare Value-Based Purchasing Programs: Findings from an 
Environmental Scan, Literature Review, and Expert Panel Discussions,” Rand Health, 2014.  
93 Dan Verel, “Hospitals Adjust to ‘value-based’ Medicare,” North Bay Business Journal, February 18, 2013. 
94 Measuring outcome success for the purpose of hospital payment utilizes twelve clinical metrics including the 
effectiveness of treatment on heart disease, hospital-borne infections, pneumonia, and diabetes. Seventy percent of 
the scores are based on clinical measures, while thirty percent will be determined by patient satisfaction surveys 
including emergency room wait times and physician responsiveness. Id. 
95 Jordan Rau, “Nearly 1500 Hospitals Penalized Under Medicare Program Rating Quality,” Kaiser Health News, 
November 14, 2013. 
96 Even prior to the introduction of Medicare Pioneer ACOs, 150 commercial accountable care organizations were 
already in operation and the number has grown. Id.  
97 Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, “Blue Plans Improving Healthcare Quality and Affordability Through 
Innovative Partnerships with Clinicians,” Blue Perspective, 2014, www.bcbs.com/healthcare-news/press-center/BP-
and-Quality-and-Plan-Innovations.pdf.  
98 “Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies Direct More Than $65 Billion in Medical Spending to Value-Based Care 
Programs,” Blue Cross Blue Shield, July 9, 2014, http://www.bcbs.com/healthcare-news/bcbsa/bcbs-companies-
direct-more-than-65b-in-medical-spending-to-value-based-care-programs.html.  
99 Reed Abelson, “Health Insurers Are Trying New Payment Models, Study Shows,” New York Times, July 9, 2014.  
100 Katherine Baicker and Helen Levy, “Coordination versus Competition in Health Care Reform,” 369 New 
England Journal of Medicine 9 (2013). 
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employees’ compensation. It has long been recognized that increased employer contributions to 
Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) result in a stagnant compensation system for many 
workers who, as a result, have been excluded from sharing in the growth of the economy for at 
least the past decade.101 Recognizing that the costs of health insurance are bumping up against 
the payers’ appetite to pay should drive commercial insurers to find ways to reduce health care 
costs and concomitantly lower the cost of health insurance. 
While it is too soon to make any statistically significant projections on the success of 
commercial ACOs, there are reports of some success stories. For example, Illinois’ largest 
provider group and health insurer, Advocate Health Care and Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Illinois, joined forces three years ago to form the first and one of the largest commercial ACOs 
in order to better align financial incentives between the two entities and provide more 
coordinated care for the participants. In a recent story, Advocate reported data that demonstrated 
the advantages of coordinated care in reducing the number of hospital admissions and lengths of 
hospital stays of ACO patients versus patients whose care was managed in a more traditional 
manner.102 
The caveat about provider coordination is that, although the ACA and commercial 
insurers are pursuing ACOs as a pathway to lowering health care costs,103 as this article has 
argued, it has become well-recognized that coordination often generates incentives for 
consolidation that can reduce competition among providers particularly in ACOs led by 
hospitals. As has been noted previously in this article, the ACO model contains the potential for 
a policy conflict. Nudges toward provider consolidation to better provide coordinated patient 
care have the potential to create a more concentrated provider market. Greater market share has 
been demonstrated to suppress competition and give large providers a much stronger bargaining 
position than payers. Providers, led by hospitals, are particularly incentivized to consolidate for 
the purpose of creating market power against payers in an environment where provider 
reimbursement is under attack.104 Coordination can have a perverse effect: while intended to 
improve outcomes at reduced costs of care, coordination that translates into concentrated 
markets is known to instead drive up the costs of care.105 Given the data that posit a rise in 
health care costs as an unintended consequence of consolidation, the policy and regulatory 
levers incentivizing coordination should be used carefully and with full awareness of such an 
outcome. 
Fragmentation in the U.S. health care system is pervasive.106 Access to and financing of 
health care has always been fragmented - a conglomeration of social insurance, welfare, and 
private markets. Medicare, the federal insurance program enacted in 1965 that provides health 
insurance to all eligible American citizens and legal residents 65 and older and the permanently 
disabled, is a single-payer system that in 2012 provided health insurance at a single price without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Harriet Komisar, “The Effects of Rising Health Care Costs on Middle-Class Economic Security,” AARP Public 
Policy Institute, 2013. 
102 Melanie Evans, “Reform Update: Advocate Health Sees Progress with ACO,” Modern Healthcare, March 26, 
2014.  
103 Shared savings programs now account for two-thirds of Advocate’s hospital revenue. Id.  
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regard to health status, usage or age to approximately 15.7% of Americans.107 In the United 
States, only the elderly and permanently disabled can participate in a public social insurance 
system. In the same year, Medicaid, the joint federal /state health insurance program for the 
deserving poor, provided very low-cost or no-cost health insurance to 48 million or 16% of 
Americans. 108 For populations that constitute the deserving poor, government provides health 
insurance based on a welfare model. For more than 30% of Americans, health insurance is less a 
commodity and more a human right.109 However, for a large portion of the remaining population, 
private markets, largely regulated by the states, are the source of health insurance which is 
bought by employers or individuals and sold by private insurance companies, most of which are 
organized as for-profit entities.  
In addition to the fragmentation of access, delivery and provider reimbursement models 
tend to perversely disincentivize collaboration and cooperation among providers, leading to less 
efficient and efficacious outcomes.110 The current encounter-based, primarily fee-for-service 
payment system, which pays providers for what they do, not for what they accomplish, has a 
distinct tendency to reward unbundling and inefficiency.111 While Medicare, the single-payer 
system for health insurance for the elderly and disabled, sets a unit price for covered services, it 
traditionally has done little to control the volume of services or make outcome a predicate for 
payment.112 By paying for each unit of disaggregated service, Medicare reimbursement provides 
no incentives for providers to coordinate their treatment of the patient. As nicely described by the 
prestigious Institute of Medicine: 
The health care Medicare beneficiaries receive is often fragmented as patients 
among multiple physicians and across different care settings (e.g., hospital to 
home care). As a result, patients do not always receive timely care best suited to 
their needs. Fragmentation is reinforced by the failure of the current payment 
system to recognize and pay for care coordination.113 
 Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, providers are paid a global fee for patient 
care. This change in reimbursement is clearly intended to aggregate reimbursement for care 
across the patient’s providers rather than paying each provider a separate disaggregated amount 
for his or her services. The added nudge to coordinated care is that ACOs that meet quality 
benchmarks can share in any savings to Medicare from the coordination of care. Unless an ACO 
is a Pioneer ACO, there is no disincentive for not providing aggregated care. Commercial ACOs 	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women, children, parents of covered children, and the aged, blind and disabled whose income and assets have been 
determined to be categorical poverty. Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), states may expand their Medicaid 
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have a similar though less restrictive structure and, like Medicare ACOs, they are required to 
meet a quality benchmark to achieve full payment through shared savings. Although most early 
ACOs were led by health systems, the recent growth in commercial ACOs is predominantly due 
to physician rather than health system initiatives.114  
 While a rational reimbursement system that promotes both provider coordination and 
better outcomes seems intuitively persuasive, the question of whether ACOs will be successful in 
achieving these ends is hardly answered. The ACO model had existed prior to the passage of 
ACA as part of the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration, which studied ten 
participating organizations from 2005 – 2010. The demonstration showed only a modest 
decrease in the cost of care, much of that attributable to groups with populations of the dually 
eligible.115 Despite the increasing numbers of ACOs since 2010, shifting from a disaggregated 
fee-for-service system to an aggregated global fee system will not be easy.  
 One of the more fundamental flaws of many current ACO models is that they do not 
reject the fee-for-service reimbursement structure; instead, payers continue to pay ACOs on a 
fee-for-service basis for services provided by members of the clinical team. Indeed, provider fees 
are no different than the fee that providers have received in the past for the same services. 
Instead of a real redesign of the fee-for-service reimbursement structure, the ACO approach 
simply adds another layer of payment for those ACOs that provide quality care less expensively 
than the benchmark.116 This fact can create significant challenges for providers. As Harold Miller 
of the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform explains, 
Having two or more providers participating in a shared savings arrangement 
creates a version of the prisoner’s dilemma: if provider #1 makes a good faith 
effort to reduce unnecessary services but provider #2 does not, provider #2 would 
“win” by maintaining its own fee revenues while also potentially receiving part of 
the savings generated by provider #1.117 
Miller suggests that ACOs could be substantially more effective by eliminating the fee-for-
service reimbursement scheme entirely and substituting for it a payment system that truly 
incentivizes the coordination of care among the participating providers. Such true payment 
reform as episode-of-care bundled payments create a win-win-win environment benefiting 
payers whose costs are reduced, patients whose outcomes are improved, and providers whose 
margins are better.118 The question is not whether provider coordination is good for health care 
but whether the ACO reimbursement model will create enough of the right incentives to align the 
needs of providers, patients, and payers.  
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V. “IT’S THE PRICES, STUPID”119: WHAT FACTORS DRIVE THE PRICING OF 
HEALTH CARE GOODS AND SERVICES? 
  The majority of Americans will continue to buy health care through employment or 
individually in greatly expanded and much more heavily regulated private markets. 120 
Correlatively, insurers and providers will continue to sell health care in these markets. Both 
insurers, mostly for-profit entities, and providers, mostly nonprofit entities, are profit-seeking. 
For-profit entities seek profit on behalf of their owners, either private or public, to whom the 
entity owes a fiduciary obligation. Nonprofit entities seek profit for mission121 but also to survive 
a marketplace where reimbursement from public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid has 
and will continue to diminish, and reimbursement from commercial insurers is subject to ever-
increasing downward pressures from private payers such as employers, employees and other 
individuals purchasing health insurance.122 Hospitals are particularly vulnerable to downturns in 
revenue. As hospital revenue is projected to decrease, hospitals are also experiencing 
overcapacity due to excessive competition among particularly nonprofit hospitals to build bigger 
and better specialty care facilities to attract well-insured patients.123 
 The last two decades have seen escalating health care spending both in the public and 
private sectors. 124 The reasons for this rise have been hotly debated: usage, payment incentives, 
the aging of the population, waste, fraud and abuse and high prices throughout the system. In the 
recent past, there seems to be general agreement that high prices lie at the heart of the health 
spending problem in the United States.125 Prices for many health services suffer from the lack of 
either regulation or real competition, use of global budgets, transparency, and geographic 
variation.126 As a number of recent studies have demonstrated, the more concentrated the 
provider market, the more successful their price negotiations with insurers particularly in 
markets where one insurer is dominant and has the ability to steer patient volume to providers 
included in their provider market.127 Insurers, unable to prevail in price negotiations with 
dominant providers, adapt to the non-competitive environment using such tactics as “most-
favored nation” clauses guaranteeing providers will charge the same high price to other payers 
thereby exacerbating the rise in health care prices. As one commentator posits, why would 
providers seek out innovative ways to absorb risk and deliver high-value health care when anti-
competitive behavior is so reliably profitable?128 	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126 Uwe Reinhardt, “The Culprit Behind High U.S. Health Care Prices,” New York Times, June 7, 2013. 
127 Chapin White et al., “High and Varying Prices for Privately Insured Patients Underscore Hospital Market Power,” 
Center for Studying Health System Change 4 (2013).       
128 Archer, supra note 124. 
2015] THE ACA, PROVIDER MERGERS AND HOSPITAL PRICING  	   18	  
During the managed-care era of the 1980s and 90s, payers were able to capitalize on their 
market power and negotiate lower payments to providers who tended to be independent 
physicians or smaller physician groups not necessarily associated with hospitals.129 Much of the 
price reduction was due to the insurers’ ability to negotiate advantageous risk contracts with 
providers where providers received monthly or annual capitated payments which required them 
to provide all health care regardless of the amount of care the patient required during the 
capitation period. Provider market power, whether of health plans or provider groups, is thought 
to be the key to price negotiations between the two groups. When the market power of insurers 
exceeds that of the providers as in the managed care era, commercial provider reimbursement is 
likely to decrease. Hospitals particularly experience slowed growth to which they must respond 
or risk extinction. 
One of the responses of hospitals in times when revenue is threatened is increased merger 
and acquisition activity. The response to the threat of managed care in the mid-1990s drove a 
frenzy of hospital M&A activity, a wave that peaked in 1997 and experienced zero growth until 
2010, the year the ACA was enacted.130 One of the reasons for the decline of hospital M&A 
activity may be that most deals failed to live up to financial expectations. A Strategy& (formerly 
Booz and Company) examination of hospital and health systems M&A deals made between 1998 
and 2008 found that only 41 percent of the acquired hospitals outperformed their market peer 
group.131 In addition, from the late 1990s to 2007, hospitals experienced rapid growth of seven 
percent overall, dampening the demand for mergers and acquisitions that often did not improve 
profit margins.132 M&A activity did not recover in 2008 and 2009 due to the Great Recession; in 
2010 hospital merger and acquisition activity started to increase nudged by both the passage of 
the ACA and availability of more capital.133 
The Affordable Care Act, which took effect on January 1, 2014,134 makes a number of 
changes to Medicare and Medicaid payments particular to hospitals. Congress is even seriously 
contemplating a permanent solution to the sustainable growth rate, the formula by which 
Medicare reimbursement to physicians is supposed to be calculated.135 One of the changes made 
by the ACA is a 1.1 percent reduction in the annual increase to Medicare reimbursement made to 
hospitals to account for the growth in health care costs. The ACA also authorizes states to 	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expand their Medicaid populations; potentially changing the mix of hospital patients to include 
more Medicaid patients for whom reimbursement is notoriously low when compared with 
commercial and even Medicare reimbursement rates.136 Medicare has already instituted a non-
reimbursement policy for patients readmitted to hospitals within 30 days of discharge. And, 
under the ACA, Medicare reimbursement is shifting from fee-for-service to value payments, a 
change that will take a period of adjustment before becoming profitable.137 The question for 
hospitals is how to survive. 
Some hospitals will not survive the end of a long run of uninterrupted revenue growth, 
both from in-patient care and more recently from very expensive ambulatory care.138 Some will 
survive by reducing operating expenses, particularly salaries and benefits, by reducing their work 
forces or a combination of these policies. The Cleveland Clinic, ranked as one of the best 
hospitals in America and a model of health care innovation, announced in late September that it 
is reducing its payroll in response to the ACA. 139 Still others, particularly the “must-have” 
providers who are able to extract from commercial insurers prices that are significantly higher 
than nearby competitors and multiples of what Medicare pays hospitals for similar services, will 
not only survive but may thrive.140 But even “must-have” providers recognize that there may be 
limits to what payers are willing to forfeit and that even the providers will have to innovate to 
sell their products to payers who no longer are willing or able to be complicit in the 
extraordinary prices of U.S. health care.141 
Surviving an unfriendly market is not new to providers, particularly California providers 
accustomed to the severe rate cuts of the early 1990s managed care market. Employer resistance 
to rising health care costs and a response to competition from Kaiser Permanente gave health 
plans a dominant position in the health care sector resulting in greater bargaining leverage for 
private insurers. In response to the collapse in payment rates in the late 1990s, California 
providers started to consolidate, and merger and acquisition activity in the health system sector 
rose.142 Much of early M&A activity in the health care sector was horizontal hospital integration, 
the result of hospitals acquiring other hospitals. The goals of such acquisitions were not only 
economies of scale and scope that can result in a reduction in costs, but also increased market 
power with respect to private insurers that can have the effect of driving up the cost of care. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Prior to the ACA expanded Medicaid program, hospitals that provided care for a disproportionate number of low-
income people who were either uninsured or were Medicaid beneficiaries received payments from one or both 
Medicare and Medicaid Disproportionate Share payment programs. These DSH payments will slowly dry up starting 
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 M&A activity peaked in 1997 as providers responded to reductions in Medicare provider 
payments brought on by the Balanced Budget Act.143 The purpose of the Act – to reduce 
government spending on public health insurance and balance the budget by 2002 – was 
accomplished by reducing Medicare reimbursement to hospitals and physicians in order to 
extend the life of the entitlement program.144 M&A activity started to fall off in the late 1990s 
and continued to flatten out through the Great Recession. Then in 2010, M&A activity began to 
rise with 100 deals completed in 2012, more than double the number from three years earlier.145 
The analysts at Stragey& (formerly Booz & Co.) attribute this rise to a number of factors that are 
“…powerful, complex, and interconnected. Federal healthcare reform is changing the 
reimbursement mix for Medicare and Medicaid, deep budget cuts are occurring at the state level, 
and commercial payers are successfully holding the line on costs.”146 As in the late 1990s, 
providers are reacting to reimbursement cuts by consolidating to lower costs, raise capital, and 
better coordinate care. 
Hospitals are also attempting to offset losses in the in-patient market by buying up 
physician practices and offering ambulatory services, formerly performed in the physicians’ 
offices, at HOPDs for higher hospital reimbursement rates.147 However, as noted earlier in this 
paper, the most recent provider reimbursement policy recommendation by MedPAC would align 
prices for ambulatory services performed in HOPDs and physician offices at the lower physician 
office rate in a modest attempt to bring uniformity to the pricing of health care services, 
regardless of location.148 While many hospitals are currently involved in both horizontal and 
vertical mergers, these are questionable long-term strategies that come with steep opportunity 
costs.149 As has been noted by at least one Wall Street analyst, “it’s either make deals or run the 
business. It’s pretty much impossible to do both at once.”150 
The price variability and lack of transparency of health care and particularly hospital 
pricing is a well-known phenomenon. Recently, the Institute of Medicine commissioned a blue-
ribbon panel led by Harvard’s Joseph Newhouse to confront a problem which has long been 
well-recognized but not easily explained, that is why does it cost more to treat patients in some 
areas of the country than in others? The panel found first that the variability in health care 
spending in Medicare and the commercial insurer sectors do not parallel each other. The panel 
found that while most Medicare variation was due to spending in post-acute services such as 
nursing facilities, home health care and long-term care hospitals, variation in the commercial 
market was due, in large part, to higher prices negotiated by hospitals, doctors and other medical 
providers.151 This finding is corroborated by an analysis by Michael Chernow, a Harvard 
economist, who determined that 70 percent of commercial spending variation is due to different 
prices set by hospitals and doctors in different markets. The IOM panel noted this is “most likely 
reflecting varying market power of providers.”152   	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For more than three decades, experts at the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and 
Clinical Practice have documented the regional variations in Medicare spending and found that 
higher spending does not correspond to better outcomes.153 But little research has been done to 
examine the relationship between hospital pricing in the commercial market and value added. 
Expensive hospitals tend to have more prestige and brand-name recognition, giving them greater 
bargaining leverage with payers.154 There are, however, few studies on the correlation between 
price and value. While normal market behavior would dictate that quality and cost are often 
related (first-class seats on an airplane are much more expensive than coach but also much more 
comfortable), health care is not a normal market. The correlation between prices and value has 
been particularly difficult to study because of a lack of price transparency in hospital 
chargemaster pricing and, more importantly, negotiated pricing between hospitals and private 
insurers.155 
A study recently published in the health policy journal Health Affairs examines the 
relationship between hospital prices and quality of care and finds high-price hospitals’ 
performance on outcome-based quality measures mixed; their performance compared to low-
price hospitals was dependent on the outcome metric. The study found that variation in hospital 
pricing is supported by two different narratives: first, that high-price hospitals have special 
missions and unique characteristics that increase their costs and for which they should be 
compensated; and second, that some high-price hospitals have market power that allows them to 
negotiate high prices with private health plans and operate under little pressure to control 
costs.156 As discussed earlier in this paper, the finding’s second narrative is likely to be the more 
common reason for high pricing if the ACA’s preference for enhanced coordination in care leads 
to more concentrated and less competitive provider markets. The question is whether more 
concentrated provider markets will make it impossible for payers to negotiate with or exclude 
mega brand-name high-price health systems from their provider networks. And if market forces 
do not to drive down costs, will states resort to regulatory action such as antitrust litigation or all-
payer systems? 
 
VI. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIPS GO BAD: THE END OF 
A DEAL 
 In Western Pennsylvania, patients insured by Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield will be 
excluded from the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center provider network pursuant to the 
termination of a long-term contract between the area’s dominant insurer, Highmark, and its 
dominant provider group, U.P.M.C.157 Prior to Highmark’s 2013 acquisition of the ailing West 
Penn Allegheny Health System, the vertical integration of insurer and provider was beneficial to 
both groups with Hallmark providing a large patient population and U.P.M.C. the “must-have” 	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provider networks. While such an arrangement between dominant insurer and dominant provider 
is somewhat different from the more traditional hospital consolidation model, it results in the 
same type of consolidated, non-competitive and expensive health care market. U.P.M.C. 
responded to the Allegheny transaction by labeling Highmark as a competitor and a threat to its 
financial sustainability and refused to renew the current contract with Highmark that terminates 
at the end of 2014.158  
 The result of the “divorce” is that U.P.M.C. hospitals will be available to Highmark 
customers only at “out-of-network” rates, some of the highest in the country, bad news for all 
payers, particularly the beneficiaries of previously generous provider rates negotiated between 
Highmark and U.P.M.C. The end result will no doubt be the creation of a tiered network of 
providers available to patients with employer insurance covering only less expensive in-network 
care, or, alternatively, a reference pricing scheme by which insurance only pays a reference price 
for any procedure and the patient picks up the balance.159 However the price conundrum is 
solved, the divorce between the dominant provider and the dominant insurer may decrease the 
dominance of the provider, U.P.M.C.  
 This divorce threatens not only the market power of U.P.M.C. but also the dominance of 
Highmark, which, without the “must-have” provider in their provider networks, may have lost its 
ability to dominate the health insurance market. What is yet unknown is the extent of 
Highmark’s vulnerability to the defection of Highmark customers to other insurers offering 
products that include U.P.M.C. as an in-network provider including U.P.M.C. that has a health 
insurance component of its own. If Highmark customers do defect, it will be because other 
insurers are offering less expensive health insurance products because of increased competition. 
This outcome is highly dependent on whether consumers shop for provider value or reputation. 
However, since employer decisions have an impact on so many health insurance customers, 
ultimately the market outcome in this situation depends on the employers’ taste for and tolerance 
of expensive employer-sponsored health insurance. 
 This break-up between two monoliths will have collateral effects as well. One of the most 
poignant is the loss of a trusted provider by patients currently undergoing acute treatments for 
illnesses, the disruption of which could threaten the patient’s health care security.160 Under a 
consent agreement negotiated by the Pennsylvania governor and state attorney general, U.P.M.C. 
has agreed to allow such patients to continue using its doctors and facilities at in-network 
rates. 161  The end of the relationship between the two dominant health care entities in 
Pennsylvania could be the proverbial canary in a coalmine. The fallout from this breakup may 
provide a road map for the behavior of other providers and insurers in highly consolidated 
markets. In the meantime, more effort must be made on a policy level in order to both prevent 
health care consolidations that are monopolistic, and to mitigate the negative effects of those 
consolidations that have already occurred.  
 
VII. REMEDIAL POLICIES TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF PROVIDER PRICING 
 The remedies to curb escalating provider pricing depend, of course, on the reasons for 
high prices. One of the chief questions of this article is whether merger and acquisition activity 	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in the health care sector chills competition and drives up prices.162 As has been discussed, the 
level of provider concentration in the market will be a determinate of how powerful providers are 
relative to payers. The role of both state and federal antitrust agencies in protecting competition 
in health care markets has been broadly discussed in the literature and is beyond the scope of this 
piece.163 However, as many antitrust experts have noted, it has historically not been an easy task 
for either the FTC or state attorneys general to prevent even patently suspect mergers through 
antitrust litigation. And if it is difficult to block patently worrisome transactions, it is unlikely 
that the agency will have the time, money or person-power to investigate activity where the 
potential anticompetitive effects are unclear.164 
The recent play by Partners HealthCare, Massachusetts’s largest hospital and physicians’ 
network, to acquire South Shore Hospital and Hallmark Health Systems, may be a cautionary 
tale for the future of potentially anticompetitive transactions. A review of the merger by the 
Massachusetts Health Policy Commission165 found that the merger would increase medical 
spending by $23 - $26 million each year due to increases in physician prices and increased 
utilization of Partners and South Shore facilities.166 The Commission also found that the Partners 
system would have more leverage to negotiate prices with private payers. Notwithstanding a 
finding that the transaction would drive up health care costs and adversely impact the cost of 
insurance premiums, the Massachusetts State Attorney General Martha Coakley, with knowledge 
of the Commission’s findings, reached a conduct settlement with Partners. This settlement would 
allow the transaction to be completed subject to some conditions, such as limiting future price 
increases to the rate of general inflation though 2020. 167  The settlement agreement also 
prohibited Partners from consolidating its negotiating power to leverage higher prices from 
payers.168 Since the deal was blessed by the Attorney General’s office, there has been significant 
backlash from the courts, the Commission and a coalition of non-Partners health care providers 
who ordinarily compete with each other, as well as with Partners for business.169  
This is not Massachusetts’ first experience with hospital consolidation. Partners 
HealthCare is the culmination of a 1994 merger of Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham 
and Women’s Hospital, both affiliated with Harvard University.170 Investigations by the state 
attorney general’s office have documented that the merger gave the hospitals enormous market 	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198 (2014). 
165 The Massachusetts Health Policy Commission is an entity formed by Governor Deval Patrick’s 2012 health care 
cost control law. “An Act Improving the Quality of Health Care and Reducing Costs through Increased 
Transparency, Efficiency, and Innovation,” Massachusetts General Laws ch. 6D, sec. 5 (2012). 
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167 Commonwealth of Mass. vs. Partners Healthcare System, Inc., South Shore Health and Educational Corp., and 
Hallmark Health Corp. No 14-2033 (Mass. Filed June 24, 2014). 
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leverage to drive up health care costs in the Boston area.171 A recent New York Times editorial 
entitled “The Risks of Hospital Mergers,” elucidates the continuing tension between provider 
concentration and provider collaboration:  
As this case moves forward, it will be important to find an appropriate 
balance between two concerns that tug in opposite directions. The Affordable 
Care Act has incentives that encourage hospitals and doctors to integrate their 
operations and collaborate to control costs and improve care, and Partners has 
been a leader in doing that. At the same time, such collaborations must not be 
allowed to accrue such market power that they stifle competition and drive up 
prices, as seems to have happened in Massachusetts in past years.172 
 If antitrust litigation is often unsuccessful, are there other policies that can effectively 
prevent or mitigate the power of certain providers to drive prices? Uwe Reinhardt recently 
addressed the chaotic, private health care sector price system in his New York Times blog.173 
Commenting on a series of articles written by New York Times reporter and physician Elizabeth 
Rosenthal about health care costs,174 Reinhardt roundly criticized the sloppy purchasing practices 
of employers in their role as purchasing agents for their employees. Says Reinhardt in support of 
his condemnation of the employer-sponsored health insurance system so prevalent in the United 
States: 
For more than a half a century, employers have passively paid just about every 
health care bill that has been put before them, with few questions asked. And all 
along they have been party to a deal to keep the chaotic price system they helped 
create opaque from the public and even from their own employees. . . . One 
reason for the employers’ passivity in paying health care bills may be that they 
know, or should know, that the fringe benefits they purchase for their employees 
ultimately comes out of the employees’ total pay package.175 
One peripheral question that Professor Reinhardt’s comment raises is whether employers’ 
passivity toward prices should be more broadly construed as price indifference to providing 
group insurance at all. If health care costs continue to rise and the state and federal health 
insurance exchanges succeed in providing affordable and adequate insurance to individuals, 
employers will not feel much compunction about paying rather than playing. 176  Ezekiel 
Emmanuel, one of the architects of the Affordable Care Act, predicts that by 2025 only 20% of 
employers who currently offer health insurance to their employees will still be doing so.177 His 	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Costs,” New York Times, June 1, 2013.  
175 Reinhardt, supra note 173. 
176 Julie Appleby, “Expect to Pay More for Your Employer-Sponsored Health Care Next Year,” Kaiser Health News, 
December 20, 2013.  
177 See generally, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Reinventing American Health Care: How the Affordable Care Act Will 
Improve Our Terribly Complex, Blatantly Unjust, Outrageously Expensive, Grossly Inefficient, Error Prone System,” 
Public Affairs (2014). 
 WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW [VO1. 6:2 	  25	  
prediction is based on assumptions about well-functioning health insurance exchanges that give 
individuals opportunities to express their purchasing preferences rather than relying on their 
employers to act as relatively ineffective proxies, as well as increases in compensation to make 
up for the loss of ESI.178 Of course, neither of these predicates is a certainty. 
There are others who take the opposite view. In a recent study published in Health Affairs, 
the authors hypothesize that the answer to the question of continued employer sponsored 
insurance under the ACA depends, in large part, on why employers provide insurance in the first 
place.179 There is general agreement that employers, particularly large employers, provide health 
insurance first to give themselves a comparative hiring and retention advantage, second because 
the cost of health insurance is borne primarily by workers rather than employers in the form of 
lower compensation and, more recently, insurance plan designs that shift the burden of rising 
costs to the employee, and third because ESI reflects workers’ demand for coverage.180 The 
study attempts to predict the behavior of employers to the various incentives of the ACA based 
on the outcome of various microsimulation models.181 These models predict that the ACA will 
cause little change in the number of Americans covered by ESI. If that’s the case, employers will 
need to take steps to rein in the cost of health insurance for themselves and for their employees in 
order to defy Uwe Reinhardt’s condemnation of employers as sloppy purchasing agents for their 
employees. 
Professor Reinhardt’s assertion that employers have been relatively indifferent, and 
indeed complicit, in the rise in health care costs is further borne out by analysis from other health 
economists. At the very least, employers’ response to higher prices has been limited and 
ineffective in incentivizing consumers to seek providers that charge relatively low prices. While, 
as discussed above, employers have not had much incentive to rein in the costs of health care, 
their role in rising costs has been limited by both the lack of transparency of health care pricing 
and its extreme variability. Both of these factors are, at least partly, the result of the negotiating 
power of providers vis-à-vis payers, that is insurers and employers. Even the proliferation of 
high-deductible plans appear unlikely to lead patients to choose less expensive providers such as 
hospitals because the total cost of hospitalization exceeds the consumer’s deductible, a situation 
that discourages many elective procedures. 182  Ginsburg et. al. conclude that while high 
deductible health insurance may not nudge consumers to the less expensive in-network hospitals, 
it may incentivize them to choose a yet less expensive option – an outpatient facility – where the 
price of the procedure is lower than any inpatient procedure, whether in or out of network.183 	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Such a choice presupposes adequate information about the price of the procedure in an outpatient 
facility. Given the state of provider price transparency, this information may be difficult to 
access.184 
Frustrated by high premium costs, employers are starting to take steps to reduce the cost 
of health care to themselves and their employees.185 At the same time, both providers and 
insurers are starting to recognize that many employers will no longer tolerate inexplicably high 
prices. While providers may come later to the fair than insurers, they too are considering 
innovative ways to provide health care more effectively at lower costs.186 Insurers, on the other 
hand, are much more likely to collaborate with employers because of their mutual, aligned 
interests. Like employers, insurers are payers too and experience first-hand employers’ 
intolerance for high premiums. To some extent, the success of innovation depends on 
overcoming the resistance of those who have benefitted from an existing regime; here the 
analysis focuses on not only insurers and providers but also patients who believe that expensive, 
highly reputational health care is better than less expensive health care delivered in hospitals or 
in out-patient facilities.187 Certainly disruptive innovation that includes limiting health care 
choices to those that are less expensive but higher quality is going to take some amount of 
persuasion as evident in the current backlash against narrow provider networks in the state health 
insurance exchanges.188  
In the face of consumer and provider dissatisfaction with narrow provider networks in the 
federal and state exchanges, CMS has proposed some regulation of the adequacy of provider 
networks. One of the values of limited networks is to give insurers some negotiating power over 
providers by threatening to exclude the expensive provider from its network. Network adequacy 
regulation would require the inclusion of more providers in any insurer’s network with a 
concomitant increase in provider negotiating power diminishing the ability of the insurer to 
control provider pricing and keep the costs of health care in check. While network adequacy 
regulation seems pro-consumer, it can result in higher prices, more expensive insurance policies, 
and greater expense to consumers.189 
In order for innovation to be acceptable, it should benefit not just the payer but the 
insured as well. Many of the recent changes in insurance product design frequently adopted by 
employers have simply shifted the cost of health insurance to their employees through limits on 
employer contributions to the purchase of health insurance, or limiting the type of health 
insurance available to their employees so that the preponderance of the burden of the cost falls 	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on the employees. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2014 Touchstone Survey, 44 percent 
of employers across all industries are considering high-deductible health plans as the only 
insurance option for their employees.190 Health insurance with high out-of-pocket costs to the 
insured tends to depress utilization particularly during recessionary times where under- and 
unemployment tends to be high. PwC’s prediction of health care cost trends for 2015 illustrates 
the effect of high out-of-pocket costs on health care spending, a net 4.8 percent, two full 
percentage points lower than the gross 6.8 percent rate of growth.191 
The effect of high out-of-pocket spending may seem to bend the cost curve but this result 
is illusory. Consumers with high out-of-pocket health care expenses may elect to forego 
sometimes necessary or preventive health care because they cannot afford the burden of high 
out-of-pocket costs. While this outcome may drive down NHE because of lower utilization, it is 
neither effective nor efficient.192 As the RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 1970s and 
1980s demonstrated, health care utilization is surprisingly price sensitive often resulting in 
perverse underutilization of health care, a result that makes the system less effective for 
consumers.193 And while cost shifting may be a rational response of employers to rising health 
care costs, it does little to change provider behavior with respect to either prices or costs. Cost 
shifting simply transfers the burden of high-priced services from one payer to another without 
affecting the price of the service. On the other hand, higher out-of-pocket costs may encourage 
more prudent purchasing by consumers who, by necessity, become more cost-conscious. 194  
However, notwithstanding some efforts to reveal provider pricing, lack of meaningful 
information about prices creates substantial barriers for individuals wishing to make better value-
based purchasing decisions.195 Because the majority of Americans still access health care 
through ESI, cost-consciousness may be best achieved by employers who adopt smart 
purchasing policies that enable employees to make choices that balance quality and cost.196 This 
includes price transparency as well as good counseling by employers or insurers on calculating 
possible out-of-pocket expenses. Even smart purchasing policies, such as reference pricing, can 
involve cost-sharing burdens for the insured unaware of the potential for insurance design and 
regulatory pitfalls.197 This is particularly true since the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, in its January 2014 	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guidance, blessed employers’ discretion to count employees’ coinsurance amounts for out-of-
network balance billing toward the ACA out-of-pocket spending limits.198 
Insurance that is designed to incentivize value-based purchasing of health care can work 
in a number of ways. One way is to offer health insurance for all or just elective services that 
exclude the higher-priced providers by the use of limited provider networks.199 The experience of 
Medicare Advantage has been instructive; while MA plans all have limited provider networks 
compared to fee-for-service Medicare, 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries enroll in a Medicare 
Advantage plan because benefits are more generous and premium costs are lower.200 Health 
plans sold in the new health insurance exchanges also take advantage of limited provider 
networks to drive down costs although there has been much complaint about narrow provider 
networks and it is surely possible that states will respond to these complaints by expanding 
networks with, a concomitant rise in health insurance premium costs. 201  For Medicare 
beneficiaries, limited networks result in access issues; for the commercially insured, limited 
networks increase the risk of higher health care costs for the insured because of the need to go 
out-of-network to find specialists who are unavailable in a narrow network.202 Providers who 
have not contracted with payers with regard to reimbursement can and do bill the patient for the 
balance of the bill for their services not paid by the insurer. Balanced billing for non-emergency 
services is becoming a more prevalent problem for patients as insurers narrow their provider 
networks and the patient is uninformed about a provider’s network status.203 The ACA provides 
some assistance to patients who receive emergency services from an out-of-network provider by 
requiring that the payer reimburse the out-of-network provider in an attempt to prevent the 
provider from balance billing the patient.204 
Other less blunt and perhaps more palatable possibilities are tiered-provider networks and 
a reference-pricing system. Both of these models work similarly; the insured can elect a higher 
price provider or tier and pay the out-of-pocket difference between the provider’s price and the 
reference price. Tiered pharmaceutical benefit formularies where many drugs in a therapeutic 
class are covered but with different cost-sharing requirements are common in private and public 
health insurance design. Tiering providers is a much more complex process than tiering 
pharmaceuticals and often more powerful hospitals refuse to negotiate with payers who use this 	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process unless they are part of the preferred tier.205 Although HDHI and limited networks are 
blunter instruments used to attain savings, because they are easier to administer and more cost 
effective for the payer, they are much more frequently utilized. However, they are much less 
effective in pushing back against market power of high-priced providers. 
Reference pricing may be a different story. There is evidence both in the U.S. and Europe 
that reference pricing not only incents the choices of the insured, but can also have a positive 
effect on the pricing conduct of high-priced providers.206 Reference pricing is used most 
commonly for standardized, non-urgent services such as orthopedic surgery, arthroscopy and 
cataract removal surgery, and imaging and laboratory services that have fairly uniform care-
delivery protocols and quality outcomes, but high price variability. Purchasing such services 
from high-priced providers is considered low-value because comparable services can be 
purchased for less.207 
The employer electing to use reference pricing designates a ceiling or cap on insurance 
coverage for a procedure – the reference price - and consumers can choose between a provider 
who charges the reference price or less and incur no cost sharing or, alternatively, choose a more 
expensive provider and pay the difference.208 Clearly reference pricing requires that employees 
have information about the prices and quality of services. While reference pricing and tiered-
networks have not gained much traction in the commercial markets because of the market power 
of dominant providers to drive the transaction with payers,209 reference pricing has recently been 
used to lower the costs of care. 
The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) discovered that 7.5 
percent of their $7 billion health care budget was due to joint and muscle condition procedures. It 
went to Anthem for advice on how to reduce the cost of hip and knee replacements and Anthem 
suggested reference pricing.210 In response to a variation in hospital pricing for replacement 
surgeries with a spread of $100,000, CalPERS, partnering with Anthem, adopted a value-based 
purchasing design system.211 It set a $30,000 limit, the reference price, on what it would pay for 
the procedure. The reference price was based on a claims data supplied by Anthem that showed a 
sufficient number of California hospitals performed high-quality hip and knee replacement 
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surgeries for the reference price or less to insure access for CalPERS 1.3 million members.212 
Not only did reference pricing result in a 19 percent reduction in costs for hip and knee 
replacements,213 it also incentivized a change in pricing strategy from the high-price providers, 
half of whom made significant reductions in their pricing.214 The reference pricing experiment 
saved the state of California $6 million.215 As James Robinson, health law and policy professor 
at UC Berkeley says, “Reference pricing won’t be a solution to all the ills of the U.S. health-care 
system. But it can make a contribution.”216  
As noted above, the key to the success of value-based purchasing is that the reference 
price is set so that the patient has sufficient access to high quality care. In Europe, value-based 
cost-sharing policies are established by national governments, or in the case of competing health 
insurers, by purchasers, but limited by parameters of a national framework. In the U.S., private 
purchasers seem to be the sole determinants of value rather than the government as part of public 
health insurance programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.217 The surprising outcome in the 
CalPERS experiment was that reference pricing not only saved money for both the state of 
California and its employees, but also had a competitive effect on pricing among higher-priced 
providers. Soon after CalPERS rolled out its reference pricing program, hospitals that had not 
been designated as value-based renegotiated their contracted prices with Anthem in order to 
retain their CalPERS patients. CalPERS’ size – 1.3 million members – may well have been the 
reason for the price negotiation.218 It may be that the success of reference pricing in increasing 
provider competition will need to start with large employers with sufficient numbers of 
employees to give them leverage in pricing decisions. 
Hoping to expand on its success with reference pricing, CalPERS has recently rolled out 
an online comparison shopping tool for medical care, calperscompare.com, for its employees 
who select Anthem preferred provider network plans.219 These patients are the optimum group to 
get this information because they have the most discretion in provider choice. The new shopping 
tool gives PPO employees information about a number of factors including price, quality, patient 
satisfaction, and convenience. It will surely be interesting to see if reliable transparency is 
sufficient, without reference pricing, to incent value-based purchasing by employees. On a larger 
scale, the Health Care Cost Institute, on May 14, 2014, announced a joint initiative with three 
large health care insurers – Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare – to provide a free, secure, 
online tool to provide to health care purchasers timely relevant information such as cost and 
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quality to be used by employees, employers and regulators for value-based purchasing of health 
care services.220 
In a May 2, 2014, FAQ, the administration essentially blessed reference pricing for large 
or self-insured employers including, for prescription drug coverage, the use of a generic drug’s 
price to set the reference price. 221 The FAQ clarified that the excess cost of an employee’s 
provider choice in a plan that used reference pricing would not, at least for the moment, be 
counted toward the cap on employees’ cost sharing.222 There are mixed reactions to the policy; 
health economists and policy experts applaud the move toward reference pricing to slow health 
care spending while consumer advocacy groups fear that it is likely to make health insurance 
even more complex and could expose unwitting consumers to thousands of dollars in out-of-
pocket costs.223  
Private employers have been experimenting for some time with the defined contribution 
approach to health insurance. Having had much success in converting employees’ defined 
benefit pension plans to defined contribution 401k plans, employers are using the same concept 
with health insurance. Instead of guaranteeing the benefit, the employer provides a contribution 
toward the purchase of a plan. One form that defined contribution health insurance has taken is 
health savings accounts funded by the employer’s defined benefit that the employee can use to 
purchase a health insurance policy. A second kind of defined contribution health insurance tactic 
is a private health insurance exchange. Employees use the employer contribution to purchase 
health insurance from a private market of health insurance plans established by benefits 
managers. The excess cost of the plan over the amount of the defined contribution is paid for by 
the employees.224 The value of the private exchange is that it facilitates the migration from 
defined benefit to defined contribution while retaining the employer’s involvement in its 
employees’ health insurance choices.225 Large employers like the private exchange model 
because they get the reputational benefit of offering their employees health insurance without 
having to manage the insurance offerings themselves. 226  However, if convenience to the 
employer is the only benefit of private exchanges, employees may soon catch on.227 History has 
taught us that all innovations must benefit the employee as well as the employer or risk 
obsolescence.  	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 Providers are starting to become involved in cost-conscious, high quality choices. The 
innovative Cleveland Clinic has entered into a number of direct contracting agreements with 
employers such as Wal-Mart to provide cardiac surgery for employees and dependents for a 
negotiated bundled payment. The Clinic’s Program for Advanced Medical Care finds great 
opportunity in directly contracting with employers skipping the typical payers – the insurers – 
entirely. 228. As Michael McMillan, the Clinic’s executed director of market and network services 
says: 
We believe that employers and providers working together directly creates an 
opportunity for innovation and to create new ways not just to address the needs 
employees have when they are sick but also how to keep employees healthy.229. 
Direct contracting is a relatively new market solution to achieve value-based purchasing that 
seems to be a good answer but it is far too early to evaluate whether it will succeed in the long-
run. Providers have many well-honed skill sets but managing actuarial risk has traditionally not 
been one; a full-risk contract with an employer could be very risky for an inexperienced 
provider.230 A limited risk contract, at least at the outset, may give the provider the necessary 
time to scale the learning curve challenge that direct contracting requires. While the success of 
direct contracting is quite unpredictable, it is one more innovation that may achieve cost-
conscious high value health care purchasing using the market model that Americans seem to 
prefer. 
 The most recent market-based, value-based purchasing strategy is a joint effort of one 
California insurer and a number of “fiercely competitive” Los Angeles hospitals.231 In an effort 
to balance the upside value of health care coordination with the downside of provider market 
consolidation, the organization structure is a joint venture between Anthem Blue Cross, a 
powerful California insurance company, and seven Los Angeles hospitals. These companies 
have been competitors for the business of selling health care to the insured, and create a new 
H.M.O. insurance plan, Anthem Blue Cross Vivity, with a narrow but AAA provider network.232 
Unlike high deductible insurance products that have been the product of health care reform 
heretofore, the new H.M.O. model will provide health insurance for premium and co-payments 
only with no deductibles or coinsurance.233 The goal of the venture is to provide the level of 
coordinated, high quality and efficient care that has previously been associated with a handful of 
health systems such as Intermountain Healthcare in Utah, Geisinger Health System in 
Pennsylvania, and, most importantly, Kaiser Permanente in California for an affordable price.234 
The success of the new HMO will depend on participating hospitals’ willingness to find ways to 
deliver high quality affordable health care. 
 In California, Vivity will be trying to accomplish what Kaiser Permanente has been 
doing for decades, but with at least some hospitals with big brands like UCLA Health and Cedar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Helen Adamopoulos, “Working Together to Contain Costs: What Hospital Leaders Need to Know for Successful 
Direct Contracting with Employers,” Becker’s Hospital Review, June 27, 2014. 
229 Id. 
230 Id.  
231 Reed Abelson, “Hospitals and Insurers Join Forces in California,” New York Times, September 14, 2014. 
232 Narrow provider networks are often problematic because they present the insured with not only fewer provider 
choices but fewer still name-brand provider choices because name-brand providers are expensive. Id. 
233 Bob Herman, “Reform Update: Will Anthem’s Vivity gain traction among large employers,” Modern Healthcare, 
September 18, 2014. 
234 Id. The hospitals in the joint venture are UCLA Health, Cedars-Sinai, Good Samaritan, Huntington Memorial, 
MemorialCare Health, PIH Health and Torrance Memorial Health. 
 WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW [VO1. 6:2 	  33	  
Sinai. The collaboration of providers and insurers is so unusual that it has taken the health care 
market by surprise. But the question really is: why has it taken so long? As Jonathan Gruber, 
health economist and architect of the Affordable Care Act, puts it, “for years, the question has 
been why hasn’t this happened?”235 Undoubtedly, health care prices and costs have incentivized 
providers and payers to try to compete with Kaiser on Kaiser’s turf. “The move by Anthem and 
health systems to compete with Kaiser Permanente suggests that rising healthcare prices have 
‘reached the breaking point.’”236 To demonstrate their dedication to the principle of affordable 
high quality health care, the principals in the joint venture will share both profits and losses of 
the endeavor.237 The question is whether seven different health systems can agree on a single 
plan for the success of the venture. Vivity is different from Kaiser in that seven already 
successful and entrenched health systems are trying to find a single road to collaborative, 
affordable health care, which could be hard. 
If market solutions fail to be effective in reducing prices, there are regulatory options 
such as banning certain hospital contracting practices, including hospitals’ refusal to contract 
according to placement in tiers.238 Antitrust policy is another important area where regulation can 
make a difference although the DOJ and the FTC have not been particularly successful in 
antitrust litigation against hospital and health system merger and acquisition activity.239 But 
states like Massachusetts have given authority to the agency charged with the task of bringing 
down the costs of health care to oversee provider merger and acquisition activity.240 How 
successful its efforts will be remains to be seen.241 At the federal level, the FTC and the DOJ 
have committed to closely monitoring activity of ACOs participating in the MSSP for anti-
competitive effects using data provided by CMS.242 Initially, the MSSP proposed rule mandated 
an antitrust review for certain collaborations as a condition of entry in the Shared Savings 
Program but the final rule eliminated the review requirement.243 This compromise surely reflects 
two competing policy issues raised by the fostering of ACOs by the ACA: coordination of care 
and market concentration.244 Again, how successful this dual-purpose enforcement policy will be 
in ensuring a pro-competitive provider environment remains to be seen.  	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 Finally, if provider pricing power cannot be mitigated by a less constrained regulatory 
environment, some form of price regulation may afford the best solution. As a threshold 
consideration, regulations setting hospital prices for certain procedures or establishing global 
spending budgets do not sit well with Americans who are more familiar and comfortable with 
private market pricing schemes. But states are starting to experiment with all-payer systems, 
global budgets for health care, and databases that seek to create transparency in hospital 
pricing.245 
Massachusetts’ 2012 legislation seeking to improve health care quality and reduce 
costs246 sets targets for growth in health care spending; over the next five years, the new law sets 
a target for state health spending equal to the long-term average annual growth of the state’s 
economy.247 For 2013, the growth cap was 3.6 percent. Given that projected growth of national 
health care spending for 2013 was 6.3 percent, containing growth to 3.6 percent is a really 
aggressive goal.248 The legislation also authorized the establishment of an eleven-member 
independent Health Policy Commission whose job it is to oversee the actual spending of provider 
groups and require those with above-target spending to take corrective action. While there is 
little enforcement authority in the legislation, the fact that a state has the political resolve to 
make a long-term commitment to a multi-faceted approach to controlling health care costs 
speaks to its commitment to the goal. 249  Though the plan may ultimately not work, 
Massachusetts again is the “canary in the coal mine” with respect to health care reform and its 
success or failure may provide a map to the way forward for other states. 
 Maryland is a state that has always been very innovative and proactive about health care 
costs by focusing on pricing. Since the mid-1970s, Maryland has set hospital prices at a single-
rate using an all-payer system made possible by a 36-year-old Medicare waiver that allows the 
state to set the Medicare hospital rate rather than the federal Medicare program.250 Maryland is 
the only state to have adopted a non-discriminatory all-payer system.251 Under the original 
waiver, Maryland’s prices could not grow faster than the prices set by the Medicare program but 
growth in health care cost made it difficult for Maryland to meet spending benchmarks.252 The 
CMS recently approved a Maryland proposal to continue to set hospital prices while capping 
hospital spending growth to 3.58 percent (the anticipated overall growth of the state economy) 
for the next five years. Instead of paying hospitals for volume, the new pricing system will pay 
based on value. This experiment in European-style price regulation will either serve as a model 
to other states or as a cautionary tale, but Maryland had little choice.253 It was in jeopardy of 	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losing its Medicare waiver; an event that would have an annual financial impact of $1 billion in 
lost Medicare reimbursements for uncompensated care.254  
 The U.S. is just embarking on a journey of unprecedented changes to our health care 
access, payment and delivery systems. These changes may ultimately improve access and bring 
down the numbers of uninsured by creating additional pathways to affordable health insurance 
but even this fundamental goal of the ACA is uncertain. It is dependent on a number of factors 
among which are the extent and success of the expanded Medicaid program; the capability of the 
state health insurance exchanges to both motivate prospective buyers and offer them affordable 
insurance products within the coverage requirements of the ACA; and, the potential of delivery 
and payment system reform to drive prices and costs down while improving quality. Those 
hurdles are themselves a herculean task. 
What clearly has not changed is our preference for and reliance on a market model. The 
few mandates included in the ACA to make health insurance accessible and affordable to 
virtually all Americans have been met with heavy resistance from an assortment of contingencies 
and, with the postponement of the large employer pay-or-play mandate until 2015 and 2016,255 it 
is unclear whether the ACA’s fundamental shared responsibility model will be realized. While 
there seemed to be quite strong public agreement in 2009 that the U.S. health care system needed 
major reform, there seems to be little appetite for a more regulated market, at least with regard to 
the amount of money that is actually spent on care including expensive interventions that do not 
improve outcomes. That preference is notwithstanding data from other OECD countries that 
demonstrate that regulatory measures can exercise a downward pressure on prices.256 It is also 
notwithstanding the findings of much current research on the correlation between cost and 
quality in the U.S., some of which has been discussed above. Americans may be so entrenched in 
the existence of a positive correlation between price and quality in other markets that its 
nonexistence in the health care market is cognitive dissonance. It is simply too difficult for us to 
delink price from quality.  
Given our preference for the free market as the mechanism for the buying and selling of 
health care, the job of bending the cost curve will require policy changes that nudge both 
providers and consumers toward less wasteful, more efficient and lower cost health care. To 
quote a distinguished group of health policy experts, “Although many in the health industry 
perceive that it is not in their interest to contain national health spending, it is a fact that what 
cannot continue will not continue.”257 As in Maryland and Massachusetts, eventually intolerable 
circumstances will force change. At the top of the list of systemic changes advocated by the 
panel of health law experts is the promotion of payment rates with global targets. Recognizing 
variations in pricing as an artifact of concentrated provider markets, the panel suggests a private 
market approach to Maryland’s all-payer system.258  “Under a model of self-regulation, public 
and private payers would negotiate payment rates with providers, and these rates would be 	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binding on all payers and providers in a state.”259 These all-payer rates would be subject to a 
global spending target for both public and private payers set and enforced by an independent 
council of experts representing all parties with an economic interest in a sustainable health care 
system. It is the hope of this author that the recent flurry of experimentation with solutions to the 
problems raised by this paper is not just a momentary toe in the water but a serious effort to 
solve the cost-quality conundrum. It is certain that what exists today is, in the end, a zero-sum 
game which cannot and will not continue. 
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